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Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically
in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but
not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their
purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of
contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by
Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested
by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, Elliott Sober (1990, 1999, 2007, 2008) has developed and
defended a criterion of testability that, unlike falsifiability, covers probabilistic
hypotheses and, unlike typical Bayesian criteria, covers hypotheses that cannot be
assigned probabilities. Relying on the concept of suitable auxiliary assumptions,
Sober defines the testability of a theory only in contrast to another theory, and
argues that intelligent design (ID) cannot be tested against evolutionary theory
(ET).
While Boudry and Leuridan (2011, §3.6, B&L from now on) agree with Sober
that testing is contrastive, they criticize his conception of suitability as too re-
strictive, arguing that it does not allow for certain intuitively valid inferences that
would render ID testable, but disconfirmed. To liberalize the conception, they
suggest an additional sufficient condition for suitability based on simplicity and
unification.
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In this note, I will argue that B&L misconstrue both Sober’s criterion of
testability and the version of ID that Sober claims cannot be tested against ET.
As a result, the inferences they claim to be intuitively valid either are not, or can
be accommodated by Sober’s criterion. And while B&L do not spell out their
sufficient condition for suitability explicitly, it trivializes contrastive testability in
a number of plausible interpretations.
However, B&L have pointed to a real problem. It just lies neither with the aux-
iliary assumptions nor with contrastive testability, but rather with the hypotheses
themselves and Sober’s contrastive conception of confirmation.
2 Contrastive testability, contrastive confirmation, and
suitability
Sober (2008, 152) defines contrastive testability as follows:
Definition 1 (Sober). Hypothesis H1 can now be tested against hypothesis H2 if
and only if there exist true auxiliary assumptions A and an observation statement
O such that (i) Pr(O|H1 & A) 6= Pr(O|H2 & A) [and (ii) A is suitable for H1, H2,
and O].
Definition 2 (Sober). [Auxiliary assumptions A are suitable for H1, H2, and O
if and only if] we now are justified in believing A, and [ . . . ] the justification we
now have for believing A does not depend on believing that H1 is true or that H2
is true and also does not depend on believing that O is true (or that it is false).
Pr(O |H & A) is called the likelihood of H (for O , given A). Thus H1 is testable
against H2 if and only if their likelihoods for some observation O given some A
differ, where it must be possible to justify A without relying on the truth of H1,
H2, O, or ∼O. Note that it is irrelevant for A’s suitability whether H1, H2, O, or∼O could be justified by relying on the truth of A.
Sober (2008, 145) argues by way of example that, on pain of triviality, not
every auxiliary assumption is suitable. Imagine that Jones is being tried for murder,
and that a size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and .45 Colt shells have been found at
the crime scene. To establish the alternative hypothesis that Smith is the culprit,
Sober explains, it is not enough to simply stipulate the assumption that Smith
is a Colt-owning smoker with size 12 feet, while Jones is not. For an analogous
stipulation with the roles of Smith and Jones reversed would lead to the opposite
conclusion.
In this example, the question is one about confirmation, not testability. The
tacit switch relies on two further assumptions. First, a hypothesis is tested by
an observation O if and only if it is confirmed or disconfirmed by O. Thus if a
stipulated auxiliary assumption is not suitable for confirming a hypothesis (such
as that Smith is the murderer) or disconfirming it by confirming its competitor, it
is also not suitable for testing it.
Furthermore, Sober (1999, 48) states for any relation R:
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If a set of observations provides a test of a proposition because it bears
relation R to that proposition, then a proposition is testable when it
is possible for there to be a set of observations that bears relation R to
the proposition. Testing is to testability as dissolving is to solubility.
By the converse of this relation, a stipulated auxiliary assumption is not suitable
for the testability of two hypotheses because it is not suitable for the testing of
two hypotheses.
Thus H1 can be tested against H2 if and only if there is an O such that O
confirms H1 against H2 or O disconfirms H1 against H2. This suggests
Definition 3. O now confirms hypothesis H1 against hypothesis H2 if and only
if there exist true and suitable auxiliary assumptions A such that Pr(O|H1 & A)>
Pr(O|H2 & A).
Definition 3 is equivalent to Sober’s definition of O favoring H1 over H2
(Sober 2008, 32), except that it takes auxiliary assumptions into account. This
is necessary because “hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on their
own” (Sober 1999, 54). B&L tacitly rely on definition 3 when criticizing Sober’s
conception of suitability by arguing that, in some cases, ID is intuitively confirmed
but not contrastively confirmed according to definition 3. Like Sober and B&L,
I will therefore assume definition 3 for the following discussion.1 The problem
with contrastive testability, B&L claim, lies with Sober’s definition of suitability.
3 Contrastive testability and valid inferences
B&L argue against Sober’s claim that ID “cannot be tested against evolutionary
theory, at least at present” (Sober 1999, 66f; cf. 2008, 148). More generally, they
argue that many examples of intuitive confirmation are not examples of contrastive
confirmation. I will discuss each of their four examples in turn.
3.1 Excursion or Murder?
B&L suggest to change Sober’s example of the murder case so that the evidence
additionally includes blood stains and broken glass in the bedroom but no body,
the supposed victim (a landlord) is a non-smoker who neither owns a gun nor has
size twelve feet, and the investigating detective has to decide between
H1 The landlord was murdered.
H2 The landlord is alive and left for an unexpected walk.
H3 The landlord killed himself and was dragged away.
1For the record, I doubt that it is correct: For confirmation, one must take the maximal set of
suitable auxiliary assumptions into account. Since the following discussion will be about whether
specific auxiliary assumptions can, not should be included, this will not make a difference.
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B&L (§3.1) claim:
If the detective favors the murder hypothesis, we submit that she is
justified in making the additional assumption that the hypothesized
murderer, whoever it was, wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars and
used a Colt .45. This would be a matter of sound detective work, not
of baselessly accusing Smith or Jones.
This is probably correct, but also irrelevant because the question was not whether
the detective can infer the anatomy, smoking habit, and possessions of a hypothet-
ical murderer, but whether H1, H2, or H3 is confirmed by the evidence. Sober’s
definition of suitability does not lead to a problem in this case. For one, given that
even unexpected walks tend not to involve gun shells, shattered glas, and profuse
bleeding, all of which are more probable in case of a murder, H1 is contrastively
confirmed against H2 by the evidence. Thus definition 2 of suitability is not too
exclusive for H1 to be contrastively confirmed against H2. It is also fairly plausible
that H1 is contrastively confirmed against H3 because it is arguably more probable
that someone breaks a window when illegally entering a bedroom than when
dragging a body. In any case, the evidence does not obviously intuitively confirm
H1 against H3 either, so there is no counterexample.
Of course, B&L are not interested in the confirmation of H1, but of A1.
2 They
give what I take to be meant as a rephrasing of H1:
O A size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and shells from a Colt .45 revolver were
found in the bedroom.
H1 The landlord was murdered by X .
A1 X wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars and owns a Colt .45.
B&L note that any plausible auxiliary assumptions K that we may justify inde-
pendently of the evidence at hand do “not warrant our adopting A1. Only the
conjunction of K with O and H1 does”. But again, the question should not be
whether A1 is confirmed, but whether H1 is confirmed. B&L have switched the
roles of the hypothesis and the auxiliary assumptions: In their informal descrip-
tion, B&L state that the detective favors H1, that is, counterfactually assumes H1
to be justified, and can thus infer the anatomy, smoking habit, and possessions of
the hypothetical murderer. The correct description of the situation is thus:
O A size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and shells from a Colt .45 revolver were
found in the bedroom.
A2 The landlord was murdered by X .
H4 X wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars and owns a Colt .45.
2They assume that the detective “tentatively favors” H1 and want to determine whether A1 can
be justified (Boudry, personal communication).
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If the competing hypothesis is, for example, ‘X does not wear a size 12 shoe,
smokes cigars, or owns a Colt .45’, one can see that the evidence contrastively
confirms H4 when we help ourselves to some auxiliary assumptions that are
justified independently of the evidence at hand (e. g. the general frequency of
other people’s cigar ash, shells, and footprints found in private bedrooms).
3.2 Motivated expert or lazy dilettante?
Moving on to ID, B&L (§3.3) consider a situation in which “William Paley, reflect-
ing on the origin of the human eye, constructed the following design hypothesis,
conjoined with two additional assumptions”:
H The human camera eye was created by an intelligent designer.
A1 The designer is interested in creating camera eyes.
A2 The designer is capable of designing something as complex as the camera
eye.
They claim that “the adoption of both A1 & A2 seems reasonable enough, since
their negation is completely uninteresting, in the sense of being very unlikely to
yield [O]”, which asserts the existence of camera eyes.3 Specifically,
the likelihood of both H & ∼A1 and H &∼ A2, viz. Pr(O |H &∼A1) and Pr(O |H & ∼A2) is extremely low. If we follow Sober’s
approach, however, this gives us no reason for adopting A1 & A2,
because, in the absence of background knowledge about the designer,
the independence rule is violated.
This argument for the intuitive confirmation is somewhat questionable, since
Pr(O |H & A1 & A2) can be low for some O, H , A1, and A2 even if Pr(O |H &∼A1) and Pr(O |H & ∼A2) are low as well. More importantly, it misconstrues
the situation: Paley has developed the hypothesis H1  H & A1 & A2,4 and B&L
claim that, because O is extremely improbable under the assumption of H &∼A1
and H &∼A2, H1 is intuitively confirmed. Now, since by construction Pr(O |H1)
is high, O also contrastively confirms H1 against H2  H &∼A1 &∼A2, because,
presumably, Pr(O |H2) is very low.5
3Strictly speaking, due to the use of the descriptive phrase, H either entails the existence of the
human eye (in Russell’s paraphrase), or presumes its existence (in Strawson’s paraphrase). H should
rather be ‘All camera eyes were created by an intelligent designer’ or similar. Similarly, A1 and A2
should be preceded by “If there is exactly one designer, . . . ”.
4‘ ’ denotes equivalence.
5In a footnote, B&L (§3.3, n. 4) further argue against the independence rule on the basis that
“there do not seem to be many ways of justifying the introduction of an auxiliary except by taking
the observations into account which we set out to explain. [ . . . ] Take for example: A∗1 = ‘Naive set
theory suffers from Russell’s paradox.’ [T]here is no use incorporating it as an auxiliary, because it
has no bearing on our observations in any way.” This confuses justifying a statement with justifying
its inclusion in the set of auxiliary assumptions that one considers. Sober does not restrict the latter.
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This response does not show that Sober’s claim that ID cannot be tested against
ET is mistaken, however, for Sober (2007, 3; cf. 1999, 62; 2008, 132) expressly
considers a minimal version of ID:
The single thesis of what I will call mini-ID is that the complex adap-
tations that organisms display (e. g., the vertebrate eye) were crafted
by an intelligent designer.
Thus Sober considers neither H1 nor H2, and in fact repeatedly notes that he
assumes that the designer’s intentions are unknown because the designer itself is
not specified in any way (Sober 1999, 65; Sober 2007, 6; Sober 2008, 128, n. 14).
This also defuses another criticism: B&L (§3.4, n. 7) claim that in Sober’s
approach, it is not clear how to “separate the central hypothesis from auxiliary
assumptions”. Since Sober is considering the contrastive testability of mini-ID,
every other assumption must be an auxiliary assumption. Otherwise, definition 1
(which is not restricted to specifically “central” hypotheses) has been misapplied.
Design hypotheses different from mini-ID can of course be contrastively testable
against ET (cf. Sober 1999, 61).
This points to a core misunderstanding of Sober’s criterion. B&L (§3.3) take
the role of the auxiliary assumptions to consist in “fleshing out a hypothesis”,
that is, they consider auxiliary assumptions to somehow become conjuncts of the
hypothesis. They rest this interpretation on Sober’s claim that auxiliary assump-
tions are “used to bring the hypotheses [ . . . ] into contact with the observation
O” (Sober 2008, 145). But this is mistaken, for Sober (1999, 54; 2007, 5f; 2008,
144) introduces auxiliary assumptions to address Duhem’s point that hypothe-
ses (whether “fleshed out” or not) rarely make observational assertions on their
own, but rely on other hypotheses and individual facts to get “into contact” with
observations (Duhem 1914).
3.3 A designer with little choice
B&L consider the possibility to “view the goals and abilities of the designer as the
adjustable parameters of the model” (§3.4) and imagine a situation in which
only a few ‘parameters’ in the design hypothesis [ . . . ] provide an
elegant explanation for phenomena that resist any conceivable natu-
ralistic explanation [ . . . ]. The fact that the choice of auxiliaries about
the designer’s intentions and attributes (A1, . . . ,[Am]) would depend
on the observations we set out to explain (O1, . . . ,On), without the
support of independent background knowledge, would then be of
little concern.
m is here assumed to be much less than n.6 But then, assuming that each observa-
tion determines one parameter, it is enough to make m observations to determine
6Boudry (personal communication). The quoted text mistakenly contains ‘An ’ instead of ‘Am ’.
6
Sebastian Lutz Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design—Draft: 2011-07-27
all parameters, at which point the remaining observations follow from the model.
Thus, for example, Pr(Om+1 & .. . & On | ID & O1 & .. . & Om) > Pr(Om+1 &
.. . & On |ET & O1 & .. . & Om), because, I assume, ET would be a “naturalistic
explanation”. Since furthermore O1, . . . ,Om have not been justified by assum-
ing Om+1, . . . ,On , ∼Om+1, . . . ,∼On , ET, or ID, it holds that Om+1 & .. . & On
contrastively confirms ID against ET.7
Again it has to be kept in mind that the version of ID that B&L are considering
in the example is not mini-ID. In fact, Sober (2008, 2.19) states explicitly that,
since the designer is not specified, mini-ID has enough free parameters (in form
of the possible intentions and abilities implicit in the concept of a designer) to
accommodate any sequence of observations.
3.4 A designer who writes on animals
B&L (§3.4) consider a scenario in which verses of the Hebrew Bible are observed
on beetles, and consider the following hypothesis and auxiliary assumptions:
H Beetles are created by an intelligent designer.
A1 The intelligent designer has the ability to create beetles, is inordinately fond
of them, and he has used their bodies to inscribe his Word.
B&L state that it is doubtful that there is a naturalistic explanation of the observa-
tions. However, even if all animals displayed bible verses, there were no maladapta-
tions, and no evidence for ET whatsoever, an “adherent of Sober’s approach [ . . . ]
would be unmoved [ . . . ], because the adoption of auxiliary [A2] (the properties
of the Judeo-Christian God) still depends upon looking at O1, . . . ,On (without
independent background knowledge)”. Thus, while intuitively the observations
clearly confirm ID, they do not confirm ID contrastively (§3.4).
It is clear that the observation that beetles (or all animals) have bible verses in-
scribed on them (O1, . . . ,On) contrastively confirms the hypothesis H1  H & A2
against ET, because even without auxiliary assumptions, the likelihood of H1 for
O1 & . . . & On is higher than the likelihood of ET. Thus H1 (which is again differ-
ent from mini-ID) is contrastively confirmed and provides no counterargument to
definition 2.
B&L (§3.5) modify their example and consider the scenario in which each bible
verse is written on exactly one species, and some bible verses are missing from the
animal kingdom. They state that in this case, H1 could predict the existence of
the remaining bible verses on some species.
B&L use the example to consider Sober’s definition 2 of suitability anew:
In the (novel) prediction case, the observation O that we use to test
our competing hypotheses cannot enter into our considerations for
7It is here important to remember that, unlike logical independence, the independence of
justification is not symmetric.
7
Sebastian Lutz Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design—Draft: 2011-07-27
choosing auxiliaries A1, . . . ,An , because, by definition, O has not been
observed yet. In what sense is the “independence” of A1, . . . ,An to be
understood? Is it acceptable if our justification of A1, . . . ,An depends
on other observations that are already known? If so, why does Sober
not leave room for such cases of predictive success in setting up his
intrinsic argument against design?
The answers are fairly straightforward: First, since definition 2 does not distinguish
between observations in the past and the future, ‘independence’ is to be understood
as in the previous cases. Therefore, second, the auxiliary assumptions may depend
on observations already known.
The third question can be answered by combining the previous reply and the
reply to B&L’s example of ID as a model with intentions as parameters. While some
intentions A1, . . . ,An can be determined by previous observations O1, . . . ,On , the
hypothesis that Sober considers, (i. e., mini-ID) contains so many parameters (one
intention for each observation) that O still cannot be assigned a probability. Thus
there is no predictive success.
4 B&L’s amendment trivializes contrastive testability
As with his demand that the auxiliary assumptions must be restricted at all,
Sober (2008, 145) uses an example to justify his demand that suitable auxiliary
assumptions must not depend for their justification on the observations that are
used to test the hypotheses (cf. Sober 2007, 6):
If O is true, so is the disjunction “either H1 is false or O is true”. If
you use this disjunction as your auxiliary assumption A1, then it turns
out that the conjunction H1 & A1 entails O. This allows H1 to make
a prediction about O even when H1 has nothing at all to do with
O. The same ploy can be used to obtain auxiliary assumptions A2 so
that the conjunction H2 & A2 also entails O. Using propositions A1
and A2 as auxiliary assumptions leads to the conclusion that the two
hypotheses H1 and H2 both have likelihoods of unity.
As it stands, this argument proves nothing about the relevance of the restriction
for the definition of contrastive testability, since it only shows that for one specific
auxiliary assumption, A A1 & A2, both hypotheses’ likelihoods are 1. But to
show that H1 cannot be tested against H2, their likelihoods have to be identical
for all auxiliary assumptions that are otherwise suitable.
However, the ingenuity of the choice of A1 is exactly that, if H1 and H2 are
completely unrelated to O, the likelihood of H1 & A1 is 1, while the likelihood
of H2 & A1 is not. Reconceptualized in this way, Sober’s argument is a typical
trivialization proof, since it shows that without the restriction, any two hypotheses
can be tested against each other. The argument has two tacit assumptions that are
relevant here. First, a sentence S (here: ¬H1 ∨O) logically entailed by a justified
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sentence J (here: O) is also justified, since otherwise S might be excluded simply
for not being justified. Second, Pr
 
O |H2 & (¬H1 ∨O)
 6= 1. Both of these are
plausible.
Since they consider Sober’s definition of suitability to be too restrictive, B&L
(§1) suggest “an alternative and more lenient account of auxiliary assumptions,
based on the explanatory virtue of unification”. Unfortunately, they leave the
notions of unification and simplicity (which also features in their account) and
their exact role in a sufficient condition for suitability8 on an intuitive level. A
very strict sufficient condition that plausibly captures B&L’s intention is given by
Definition 4. Auxiliary assumptions A are suitable for H1, H2, and O if A are
justified and H1 & A as well as H2 & A are simple and unifying.
One could further liberalize this condition by (i) dropping the demand that A
be justified, or (ii) changing the ‘as well as’ into an ‘or’. However, even the most
restrictive of these sufficient conditions trivializes contrastive testability.
To show that any two hypotheses H1 and H2 can be tested against each other,
let A∗ be any justified statement (for example some correct hypothesis) that is
simple and unifies some true observations O1, . . . ,Om , assigning them a high
probability. Assume the analogous for A† and O ′1, . . . ,O
′
n . Let further H1 and
H2 be independent from the observations, A
∗, and A†. Then A (∼H1 ∨A∗) &
(∼H2 ∨A†) is justified because it is entailed by A∗ & A†. Now H1 & A  H1 &
A∗ & (∼H2∨A†) is almost as simple as A∗ and A†,9 and it unifies O1, . . . ,Om . Since
the analogous holds for H2 & A, A is a suitable auxiliary assumption. But similar
to Sober’s trivialization proof, it now holds that Pr(O1 & .. . & Om |H1 & A)>
Pr(O1 & .. . & Om |H2 & A), so that O1 & .. . & Om contrastively confirms H1
against H2. Thus H1 can be tested against H2.
If definition 4 is liberalized as in (i), the assumption about A∗ and A† can be
weakened accordingly. For (ii), A can be defined as ¬H1∨A∗, which puts less strict
demands on what can be called ‘almost as simple as’. Similarly, if definition 1 of
contrastive testability itself is changed to allow for different auxiliary assumptions
A1 for H1 and A2 for H2,
10 then A1  ∼H1 ∨A∗ and A2  ∀x(x = x) are enough
to show that H1 can be tested against H2. In this case, as in (ii), one can even
demand that the auxiliary assumptions must unify the very observations used in
their justification. Thus with B&L’s sufficient condition for suitability, contrastive
testability is trivial, as so many criteria of empirical significance before it.
8B&L allow other sufficient conditions, e. g. Sober’s, as well (Boudry, personal communication).
9Similarly, according to B&L (§3.4) the hypothesis that the landlord from §3.1 staged the crime
scene to fake his own death and go underground is arguably “not far more complex” than the
hypothesis that he was murdered.
10This is in fact what B&L assume (Boudry, personal communication).
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5 A problem with contrastive confirmation
B&L (§§1,3.2) consider Sober’s definition 2 of suitability a means to avoid ger-
rymandering of the auxiliary assumptions to fit the observations. And while
their examples do not show that the definition is too restrictive,11 there is a vital
problem with contrastive confirmation that, although it has nothing to do with
definition 2, may lie at the core of their unease. The gerrymandered auxiliary
assumptions that B&L (§2.1) want to avoid can be conjoined with the hypothesis
of a designer to form a new hypothesis (cf. Sober 2008, 131–133), because Sober’s
criterion of confirmation contains no restriction whatsoever on the choice of
hypotheses to be compared. This poses no problem for contrastive testability,
since even gerrymandered hypotheses can be intuitively testable against non-
gerrymandered hypotheses. A gerrymandered hypothesis may even be intuitively
confirmed against its competitor by some observation O. However, the situa-
tion is different for confirmation in light of all observations (the total evidence):
For many a hypothesis H and many of its observational assertions O, one can
construct another (gerrymandered) hypothesis H ′ that differs from H only in
that it asserts ∼O. H and H ′ are contrastively equally well confirmed against any
hypothesis (including each other) as long as the total evidence does not contain
O. In Bayesianism, the hypotheses may differ in their prior probabilities, so that
one is more likely than the other. Proponents of inference to the best explanation
may opt for one of the hypotheses because it explains better. B&L might argue
that the more simple and unifying hypothesis should be preferred. Contrastive
confirmation, however, provides no reason to prefer one hypothesis over the other.
Thus, considering that O can be ‘The world will end tomorrow’, contrastive
confirmation may be less discerning than desirable.
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